Easements

The Drees Company, Inc v Thompson, 868 NE2d 32 (Ind Ct App 2007).

Facts: In 1988, Scott and Sarah Bemis (Bemises) owned a one-acre parcel of land surrounded by twenty-nine acres owned by Larry and Bettye Stafford (Staffords) in Carmel, Indiana. The Bemises' warranty deed included an ingress/egress easement provision over a portion of the Staffords' property, because the Bemises' could only access a public road via a private roadway on the Staffords' property. Subsequently, Frank and Janet Thompson (Thompsons) wished to buy the Bemises' property, but their title insurance company required the Staffords to execute an express grant of easement for the entire driveway used by the Bemises. The Staffords executed an express easement and the Thompsons purchases the Bemises' acre parcel.

In 2004, after the Staffords died, the Thompsons entered into a contract with Estridge Development Company, Inc. (Estridge) to sell their property, including the easement. In 2005, Drees Company, Inc. (Drees) purchased the Staffords' twenty-nine acres, understanding the existence of the easement on the property. Drees drafted plans to develop the property into a residential development containing fifty homes, preserving the easement used by the Thompsons, but would allow new residents to use the path for biking and walking.

Subsequently, the Thompsons filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief and a motion seeking a preliminary injunction against Drees. Estridge's motion to intervene was granted by the trial court based on their contractual interest in the property. The Thompsons contended that their easement rights would be improperly diminished or terminated and they would be irreparably harmed by Drees' development. Ultimately, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Thompsons and Estridge, permanently enjoining Drees from using the easement. Drees appealed.

Holding: Reversed and remanded. In general, easements are limited to the purpose for which they are granted and easements for ingress and egress confer only the right to pass over the land and not to control the real estate. This may not be the case if the easement grant language is ambiguous, but the court here found no ambiguity. From the language of the easement grant, the parties intended that Stafford would simply grant Bemis and his successors and assigns the right to come and go over Stafford's land with the requirement to share equally the cost of maintaining the roadway. As successors of Bemis, Thompson/Estridge also have only that right. Drees' development of the surrounding twenty-nine acres and possible additional use of the easement as a hike/bike trail did not impair the ingress/egress easement rights held by Thompson/Estridge to warrant a permanent injunction. When the law was applied to the facts, Thompson/Estridge were not able to demonstrate unreasonable interference with their easement rights.

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