Zoning

Wakeland v City of Urbana, 333 Ill App 3d 1131, 776 NE2d 1194, 267 Ill Dec 543 (4th D 2002).

Facts: In 1985, the City of Urbana (City) sent out brochures encouraging local businesses to buy lots on Main Street. In 1986, Wakeland bought three lots on Main Street with the intent of building an apartment building. However, in 1991 the City passed a new zoning ordinance that prohibited apartment buildings on property near Main Street. This plan included Wakeland's three lots.

In 1995, Wakeland filed a complaint for declaratory judgment to change his lots back to their original zoning, which would have allowed apartment buildings. Wakeland complained that the zoning ordinance was arbitrary because there were several lots around the area that had apartment buildings. Wakeland also claimed that the zoning ordinance dramatically reduced the value of its property. The trial court held that the zoning plan was not unreasonable or arbitrary and did bear a significant relationship to public health, safety, morals, or welfare. Thus, the zoning ordinance was not changed. Wakeland appealed.

Holding: Affirmed. The court held that the trial court was reasonable in determining that the current zoning plan was valid. The following factors were considered in making this determination: (1) the uses and zoning of nearby property; (2) the extent to which the zoning restrictions diminish property values; (3) the extent to which the diminishment of the plaintiff's property values promotes the public good; (4) the gain to the public compared with the hardship to the property owner; (5) the suitability of the property to the zoned purposes; (6) the length of time the property has been vacant as zoned in the context of land development in the area; (7) the community's need for the proposed use; and (8) the care with which the community has planned its land use and development.

The court weighed these eight factors in favor of the City. First, the majority of the properties near Wakeland's lots are single-family dwellings. The City also stated that the purpose of the ordinance was to restrict "apartment buildings and commercial buildings impinging upon traditional single-family residential areas." Therefore, since the Wakeland lots were inconsistent with nearby uses and were against the purpose of the ordinance, the first factor was weighed in favor of the City.

Second, Wakeland's lots were less valuable under the new zoning. However, the court stated "it is not determinative that the property would be worth more if the zoning were reclassified because this would be true in virtually all reclassification cases." Therefore, even though the second factor weighed in favor of Wakeland, it was not a determinative factor.

Third, the purpose of the zoning plan was to promote historical value, limit congestion, and preserve the nature of the neighborhood. The court stated that "a quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs." The trial court found that Wakeland's apartments would destroy historical homes and create more traffic and noise in the neighborhood. Thus, the third factor was weighed in the City's favor.

Fourth, the hardship conferred on Wakeland by the zoning regulation was not determined to be great. Wakeland claimed that there was a great hardship placed on him because he bought the property with the reliance that he would be able to build apartment buildings. However, the court stated that to show reliance on a zoning classification, "one must begin the planned development with reasonable promptness rather than merely hold the land for inventory or investment purposes." Thus, since Wakeland waited four years after the zoning to build, he could no claim undue hardship based on a reliance interest.

Fifth, Wakeland's lots were suitable for the zoned purpose. The purpose of the ordinance was to eliminate congestion and maintain the neighborhood. To effectuate the purpose, the ordinance restricted the property in the neighborhood to single-family dwellings. Since single-family dwellings were currently on Wakeland's lots, the lots were suitable for single-family zoning. Thus, the fifth factor was weighed in favor of the City.

Sixth, Wakeland's lots were not vacant. The properties had been rented the entire time Wakeland owned the properties. Thus, there was no length of time that the properties were vacant. As previously stated, the trial court found that there was a substantial need to halt apartment building to reduce congestion. Therefore, the seventh factor was also weighed in favor of the City.

Finally, the zoning plan was a detailed document that took several years to implement. The plan went through over thirty hearings before being adopted. Further, the zoning ordinance was applied to each section of the neighborhood one at a time. Thus, it was determined that the ordinance was created with care. Since seven factors weighed in favor of the City and only one in favor of Wakeland, the court held that the zoning ordinance was valid.

© ATG atgc0310vol27

 

Print this page