In re Application for a Tax Deed (Castleman v Jean) (IL)

2018 IL App (5th) 170354

Summary: Once property taxes become delinquent the county collector may file an application for judgment and order of sale on the delinquent property. The Property Tax Code requires that the county collector publish notice of its intent to file an application for judgment, sends a notice of the application for judgment and sale to the person in whose name the taxes were last assessed and must present proof of the mailing to the court. A tax-sale proceeding is in rem and the court acquires jurisdiction over the land when the county collector makes its application for judgment and order of sale. Furthermore, a nonparty to a judgment has no standing to seek relief from that judgment by filing a section 2-1401 petition. The nonparty must have been injured by the judgment at the time of its entry.

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Facts: On September 19, 2014 Opal Castleman filed a pro se petition for tax deed in the circuit court of Washington County, naming the following respondents: Jerry Jean, Stewart Producers, Inc., Washington County Clerk, Evelyn M. Fair, unknown owners or parties interested, and nonrecord claimants. The petition alleged that he had purchased the delinquent real estate taxes with respect to oil, gas and other mineral rights related to parcel No. 07-72-23-000-052-00. Respondent, SI Resources filed a petition to vacate the order directing issuance of the tax deed alleging that Castleman failed to comply with mandatory notice, service, and diligence requirements set forth in section 22-5 through 22-40 of the Property Tax Code. 35 ILCS 200/22-5 to 22-40 (West 2014).

On July 1, 2015, William Groome filed a motion to intervene alleging that he obtained a quitclaim deed to the mineral rights from Castleman. The circuit court granted the motion to intervene. On September 10, 2015, Groome filed a motion to dismiss SI Resources' section 2-1203 petition to vacate the order directing the issuance of a tax deed. On November 16, 2015, the circuit court entered an order granting the motion to dismiss. SI Resources filed a notice of appeal on November 24, 2015.

On November 13, 2015, Jean filed a petition pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code, to void or vacate, the circuit court's March 4, 2015, order directing the issuance of the tax deed to the Castleman. On November 16, 2015, Groome filed a motion to strike Jean's petition on the basis that Jean did not request leave to file the motion and that Jean did not have standing to vacate the order for the tax deed. On November 30, 2015, Jean filed a motion to stay proceedings on his petition pending the court's disposition of SI Resources' appeal. On December 8, 2015, Groome filed a motion to dismiss Jean's petition to void and/or vacate the order on the basis that Jean has no interest in the mineral rights, having given a quitclaim deed to those mineral rights to SI Resources on or about March 27, 2015.

On February 17, 2016, the circuit court entered an order granting Jean's motion to stay the proceedings. On November 22, 2016, the court issued an opinion dismissing SI Resources' appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that SI Resources did not have standing to file a section 2-1203 petition because it was not a party to the original action.

On February 24, 2017, SI Resources filed a motion to void and/or vacate, pursuant to section 2-1401 (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2016)), the circuit court's order directing the issuance of a tax deed, making the same claims as are stated in Jean's petition. On March 13, 2017, Groome filed a motion to dismiss SI Resources' petition arguing that SI Resources was not a party to the tax deed proceedings, had no right to redeem the property during the redemption period, and was not a proper party to a section 2-1401 proceeding.

On May 23, 2017, the circuit court entered an order granting Groome's motion to dismiss Jean's petition but denying the motion to dismiss the petition filed by SI Resources. On June 12, 2017, Groome filed a motion to reconsider that portion of the order that denied his motion to dismiss the SI Resources' petition. On June 19, 2017, Jean filed a motion to reconsider his motion that was denied. On August 14, 2017, the circuit court entered an order granting Groome's motion to reconsider, dismissing SI Resources' petition in its entirety, and denying Jean's motion to reconsider. On September 18, 2017, Jean and SI Resources filed a notice of appeal.

On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the circuit court's order granting Groome's motion to reconsider, dismissing SI Resources' petition and denying Jean's motion to reconsider.

Holding: Affirmed. The court reviewed Groome's motion to dismiss de novo. Count I of Jean and SI Resources' section 2-1401 petitions sought to have the tax deed declared void pursuant to section 2-1401(f) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1401(f) (West 2016)), based on the circuit court's lack of jurisdiction to issue the tax deed because there was a lack of notice to Jean. The court applied Vulcan Materials Co. v. Bee Construction, 96 Ill. 2d 159 (1938), to determine that the circuit court obtained in rem jurisdiction over the property after the county collector made the application for judgment and order of sale. Taking the factual allegations in count I, there is no allegation that Jean did not have notice and therefore the county collector did his due diligence, which in turn gave the circuit court jurisdiction. Count I of both petitions sought the tax deed declared void rather than voidable, which is why they were properly dismissed.

The court also found that Count II of both petitions seeking to vacate the tax deed were properly dismissed as well because a complaint may be dismissed for lack of standing pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code. Jean did not have standing because at the time he filed his section 2-1401 petition, he had no interest in the property. Jean had given his rights to SI Resources through a quitclaim deed on March 27, 2015. SI Resources also did not have standing because it had no interest in the property during the period of redemption. In Illinois, "a nonparty to a judgment has no standing to seek relief from that judgment by filing a section 2-1401 petition." Hurlbert v. Brewer, 386 Ill. App. 3d 1096, 1102 (2008). SI Resources was not a party to or in privity with any party to the judgment for the tax deed. As such, it cannot claim that it was injured and therefore had no standing to object to the tax deed. SI Resources also did not fall into any exceptions for a nonparty to have standing to pursue a section 2-1401 petition. Therefore, the circuit court did not err in granting Groome's motion to dismiss.

Opinion Year: 
2018
Jurisdiction: 
Illinois
By: ATG Underwriting Department | Posted on: Wed, 06/17/2020 - 3:21pm